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1. Introduction 
Theory maintains that the mispricing of futures contracts cannot be sustained in the presence of 
arbitrage trading by market participants. There is an abundant of empirical evidence regarding 
the efficiency of well established derivatives markets that operate in developed countries 
(Modest and Sundaresan, 1983, Figlewski, 1984, MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988, Yadav 
and Pope, 1990, Bühler and Kemph, 1995, Dwyer, et al., 1996, Neal, 1996, Tse, 2001). 
However, the empirical evidence from emerging or newly established derivatives markets is less 
frequent.  
As in the case of other developed European derivatives exchanges (see for example 
Bühler and Kempf, 1995, who study arbitrage and mispricing for the DAX index futures), 
market conditions in the Athens Derivatives Exchange (ADEX) should not allow for large and 
long-lasting arbitrage opportunities. Sophisticated low cost traders (like market makers and 
large institutional traders) should be in the best position to exploit arbitrage opportunities. First, 
arbitrageurs can avoid tracking error because both index futures contracts traded are written on 
indices that are narrow and liquid (especially the FTSE/ASE-20 index). Second, they can 
replicate the index at favourable levels of transaction costs and within a reasonable span of time, 
minimizing at the same time execution risk in the spot market (see also Tse, 2001, who 
examines futures index arbitrage for the Dow Jones industrial average). Finally, ADEX is 
operating a fully automated electronic trading system eliminating in this way the execution risk 
in the futures market.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the profitability of index futures arbitrage in 
order to provide novel empirical evidence about the efficiency of the recently established 
ADEX. The establishment of a well functioning derivatives exchange is very important for the 
Greek capital market since it can improve the overall efficiency and information dissemination 
process; it can complete the market, contribute in price discovery and can also attract foreign 
investors that can benefit from the (emerging) characteristics of this market (see Alexakis et. al., 
2007).  
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Many issues that are addressed in this study contribute to our knowledge. First it is 
important to investigate whether the relationship between the index futures prices and the 
underlying stock indices can be described by the cost-of-carry model (Cornell and French, 
1983). It is also of great importance to examine whether futures mispricings can result to 
profitable arbitrage trading in the presence of market frictions. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study that directly validates (under market frictions) the index futures market 
efficiency of ADEX using high-frequency data for the period 2002-2004. Specifically, market 
efficiency is examined by analysing the FTSE/ASE-20 index futures contract, the most liquid of 
the traded contracts; for completeness we have also consider the FTSE/ASE Mid-40 index 
futures which is the second most liquid contract.  
 Prior research has documented that derivative markets are less efficient at their early 
trading history and that the frequency and the magnitude of mispricings are diminishing over 
time (see Bühler and Kempf, 1995, Dwyer, et al, 1996, and references therein).  Thus a second 
interesting issue is to examine whether the price discrepancy between the cost-of-carry model 
and the market futures prices becomes less prevalent as time passes (indicating that the market 
becomes more mature over time).  
Third, the efficiency of the derivatives market can have implications on the lead-lag 
relationship, on the hedging effectiveness (risk management) and on the price discovery 
mechanism. For example Lafuente and Novales (2003) discuss the estimation of optimal hedge 
ratios when there is discrepancy between the futures market price and its theoretical valuation 
according to the cost-of-carry model. So the investigation of the market efficiency can be 
informative and beneficial for market participants in the ADEX.     
Finally, the interest on the properties and behavior of the ADEX is growing (i.e. 
Alexakis et al., 2007, Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2007, Kenourgios, 2005, and other related 
references therein). These empirical studies concentrate on other issues of interest and employ 
different methodologies. Our study contributes to this line of research using a new dataset and 
derives results that are over and above of what has been already seen in the extant literature 
regarding the ADEX1.  
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Our primary results lead to the conclusion that index futures contracts offer profitable 
arbitrage opportunities, especially to low cost traders (like market makers and large institutional 
traders). The futures contracts present similar mispricing rates with transactions and closing data 
and they also exhibit cyclical mispricing patterns2, evidence that complies with the findings of 
Evnine and Rudd (1985). We show that the frequency and magnitude of the futures mispricings 
remain the same even when stock index trading is delayed for at least 30 minutes3. We also 
extend the Gay and Jung (1999) theoretical model to account for the cost of borrowing stocks 
and for index tracking error. Despite introducing additional market frictions, we can still 
observe profitable arbitrage opportunities. At the end, using regression analysis, we identify 
additional factors that can explain the mispricing rates, such as time to maturity and market 
anticipated and unanticipated volatility. 
 The ADEX development is in accordance to other developed European markets 
(Kenourgios, 2005). In addition, investors in Greece have become more aware of derivatives 
trading as evidenced from the increase in the volume of futures contracts. Despite this, arbitrage 
opportunities are still very large and persistent indicating that the market does not exhibit a 
maturation effect like other European derivatives markets (see Bühler and Kempf, 1995). Our 
results indicate that for the period under investigation the ADEX has not attracted the attention 
of highly specialist and sophisticated traders that can act as arbitrageurs. We conjecture that 
most probably the market is dominated by the trading activities of hedgers4 (similar conclusions 
are conjectured by Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2007, and Alexakis et al., 2007). As suggested by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) this might happen because specialized arbitrageurs (like large 
investment banks and hedge funds) avoid extremely volatile markets when they are risk averse 
and prefer large bond and foreign exchange markets where arbitrage opportunities are better 
exploited. Nevertheless, actions have to be taken in order to attract more investors that can act 
as arbitragers since as shown by Basak and Croitoru (2006) this can improve the risk sharing 
among investors and it can enhance the liquidity of the market.      
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2. Market Structure and Frictions for ADEX and ASE 
The FTSE/ASE-20 index futures contract (namely FTASE) was first launched in late 1999. Its 
underlying asset comprises twenty blue chip stocks that are traded on the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE); these stocks account for more than 50% of the total market capitalization. A 
second stock index futures contract was introduced in early 2000 (namely FT40M). The 
underlying asset is the medium capitalization FTSE/ASE Mid-40 index and it comprises about 
15% of the total market capitalization. At any time, there are six futures contracts listed for 
trading: their maturities correspond to the three nearest consecutive months and to the three 
nearest months from the March, June, September and December quarterly cycle. The futures 
contracts expire on the third Friday of the expiration month and all positions are cash settled. 
For the period under investigation, trading hours for the ADEX are between 10:45 – 16:15 and 
for the ASE between 11:00 – 16:00 (so closing data is non-synchronous). The futures are quoted 
in index points and the multiplier is 5 Euros. For further details about the ADEX and ASE 
please refer to Kavussanos and Visvikis (2007) and also to the ADEX website: 
www.adex.ase.gr.    
Market participants can be classified in three categories: non-exchange/individual 
members, large institutional investors and market makers. Market makers are close related with 
large banks or brokerage houses and are obliged to adhere to many trading rules. Their prime 
responsibility is to enhance market liquidity by providing continuous bid and offer quotes for 
the two closest to maturity contracts. ADEX officers allow them to trade at significantly low 
transaction cost levels. Large institutional investors such as insurance companies and mutual 
funds, can also trade at favourable transaction costs because of their financial status and their 
close collaboration with an exchange member-agent. On the other hand, individuals trade at 
significantly higher costs than large institutional investors.  
Both contracts under investigation bear similar transaction cost for taking a long or 
short position in the futures contract: 15 Euros for individuals, 5 Euros for large institutional 
traders and 0.22 Euros for market makers5. The transaction cost for taking a long (short) 
position in a comparable stock portfolio that replicates the FTSE/ASE-20 index is assumed to 
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be 0.06% (0.36%) of the index level for market makers, 0.36% (0.66%) of the index level for 
institutional traders, and 0.66% (0.96%) of the index level for individuals6. As shown in Table 
1, for the FTSE/ASE Mid-40 we assume smaller transaction costs because its level is much 
higher7 than the one of FTSE/ASE-20. For long (short) positions in the futures contracts the 
initial margin requirement is set to 12% (14%) of the value of the contract8. In addition profits 
realized by derivatives are tax free. 
 [Table 1, here] 
After June 2001, ADEX introduced stock repos (stock lending contracts) and stock 
reverse repos (stocks borrowing contracts) in an attempt to make short selling available to all 
investors. The contract size is fixed at 100 shares, the time period of the stock loan is limited to 
six months and any position in stock reverse repos bears a small non-fixed interest rate. Short 
sale proceeds from the stock reverse repos plus 50% of this amount is needed as an insurance 
deposit.  
For the needs for our analysis we assume that all market participants can benefit from 
quasi-arbitrage trading (Gay and Jung, 1999, Fung and Draper, 1999), so we assume that the 
rate of availability of short sales proceeds equals unity. For the first part of our analysis we 
assume zero tracking error for taking a position in a comparable stock portfolio that replicates 
the index and we also ignore the cost of borrowing stocks. We examine the alternative 
assumption at a later stage by extending the Gay and Jung (1999) model.  
 
3. Theoretical Model Prices and Bounds for the Futures Contracts  
The cost-of-carry (CoC) model used to find the theoretical value of a futures contact, Ft, at time 
t is defined as (Cornell and French, 1983):  
 
tTtδtr
tt eSF
)( −= ,  (1) 
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where  is the current stock index level,  is the time to maturity of the contract, and  and 
 represent the annual risk-free rate and dividend yield over the period . Gay and Jung 
(1999) have shown that in the presence of transaction costs and short sales restrictions, the no 
arbitrage price must lie within the following lower ( ) and upper (F )  bounds: 
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Gay and Jung (1999) derived the above model without taking into consideration: i) the cost of 
borrowing stocks ( ) when taking short positions in the comparable stock portfolio using the 
stocks borrowing mechanism (stock reverse repos), and ii) other market impact costs that can 
result to tracking error ( ). Following their rationale, Eqs (2.a) and (2.b) present the 
extended model that accounts for these market frictions.  These new market frictions 
(parameters) mostly affect the lower bound that is related to futures underpricing. The other 
parameters of the pricing model are:  ( ) is the percentage transaction cost of a long 
(short) position in the futures contract;  ( ) is the percentage transaction cost of a long 
(short) position in a comparable stock portfolio that replicates the index
brk
trck
FLk
SLk
FSk
SSk
9; m  is the rate of 
availability of short sales proceeds (it lies in [0,1]);   ( ) is the futures margin rate for a 
long (short) index position; and finally,  represents the future value of dividends until the 
futures expiration date.  
Lq Sq
)(Tδ
 
4. Data Description and Analysis of the Mispricing Rates 
We use intraday data to reduce any non-synchronous issues10 for the period January 2002 to 
December 2004. For the FTASE (FT40M) contract we examine 721 (670) trading days 
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corresponding to 37 expiration dates. We examine the futures mispricing rates by using three 
different datasets. First, we use futures transaction prices that are as close as possible to 15:30, 
i.e. 30 minutes before the close of the underlying market. Second, we use futures observations 
that are closest to 15:59. For both previous cases the futures data are matched with the 
underlying index within 30 seconds of the futures transaction. The basic dataset is the one that 
uses intraday data closest to 15:30 and any reference takes this dataset into consideration unless 
stated otherwise. Third, we use index closing prices with futures closing prices that are non-
synchronous. It is of interest to see whether the same results can be obtained with or without 
synchronous data and if mispricings persist within the same day. Future prices are always those 
of the nearest and the second nearest expiration months (volume and open interest details are 
available from the authors upon request). Other months are excluded to eliminate any potential 
bias arising from thin trading. An appropriate dividend yield is computed from the sum of 
dividends paid out by stocks divided by the per year average market capitalization. We assign a 
constant dividend yield only during the period that dividends were paid out by companies (from 
April to August); this is a practice that is actually adopted by ADEX practitioners. Finally, the 
one and two month to expiration EURIBOR Euro rates collected from DATASTREAM® are 
used as an approximation of the risk free rate associated with the nearest and the upcoming 
futures contracts11.        
As a starting point, mispricing rates are evaluated under four different scenarios. In the 
first scenario the simple CoC as exhibited in Eq. (1) is used12. In the other three scenarios the 
upper and lower bounds are calculated according to Eqs. (2.a) and (2.b) using the transaction 
costs of individuals (Ind), large institutional investors (Ins) and market makers (MM). At this 
stage of the analysis we ignore the cost of borrowing stocks and tracking error. 
Table 2 tabulates the futures mispricing results from the three different datasets for the 
FTASE contract. The overall mispricing results are in agreement with international evidence 
from other markets (Bailey, 1989, Figlewski, 1984, Modest and Sundaresan, 1983, Brailsford 
and Cusack, 1997, Gay and Jung, 1999). One (the nearest) and two (the upcoming) months to 
expiration contracts exhibit a tendency of underpricing relative to the theoretical CoC price. 
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Underpricing is observed in about 58% (69%) of the days for the nearest (upcoming) contract 
whereas overpricing is observed in only 35% (26%) of the days examined (significant 
underpricing is also reported by Bühler and Kempf, 1995, for the DAX futures market). Under 
market frictions, the maximum percentage of fairly priced contracts is observed for non-
exchange members and the minimum percentage for market makers. For every dataset 
considered, the mispricing levels are bigger for the longer maturity contracts. In percentage 
terms the average underpricing of the nearest (upcoming) futures contract is between 0.78%-
0.97% (1.35%-1.38%) of the index level. The mispricing rates for the FT40M contract 
(available upon request), in general coincide with those of the FTASE. From unreported per 
maturity mispricing statistics concerning the FTASE contract (available upon request) we 
observe significant underpricing during October 2002 to August 2003 and April 2004 to June 
2004. Overpricing clustering is more prominent during the last months of 2004. This evidence 
is in contrast to European and other international evidence that report that index futures markets 
become more mature and mispricing rates diminish over time (see Bühler and Kempf, 1995, 
Dwyer et al., 1996, and Brailsfort and Cusack, 1997). Finally, from Table 2 is obvious that 
similar mispricing results are obtained regardless of the dataset considered. Arbitrage 
opportunities observed with the 15:30-dataset also persist with the closing prices dataset (see 
Evnine and Rudd, 1985, who document similar patterns for put-call parity violations).  
[Table 2, here] 
 We continue to check the economic significance of the arbitrage violations for low cost 
traders (market makers and large institutional investors) with ex-ante tests. In accordance to 
previous studies (Bühler and Kempf, 1995, Neal, 1996, Fung and Draper, 1999, Tse, 2001), we 
assume that upon the identification of a significant mispricing, low cost traders can immediately 
trade the futures contract and take a position in the spot market with a time delay. Using 
evidence from previous studies (i.e. Bühler and Kempf, 1995, and Dwyer, et al., 1996), two 
different time delay assumptions are made: i) one (1m) to five (5m) minutes after taking the 
futures transaction, and ii) use of same day’s index closing prices (C).  
[Table 3, here] 
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 As shown in the Table 3, profitable futures arbitrage opportunities persist in both 
frequency and level for the one (1m) to five (5m) minute cases. In the case of the nearest 
FTASE contract, when index trade execution is done with the closing price (C), there is a minor 
decrease in the number of futures overpricing and (especially) underpricing cases for both 
category of traders. This is in contrast to Bühler and Kempf (1995) who observe a large number 
of economically significant mispricings that disappear quickly because of arbitrage trading (see 
also Fung and Draper, 1999, and Tse, 2001). In addition, Dwyer et al. (1996) report for the S&P 
500 futures that as the market becomes more mature (exchange trading history becomes larger) 
mispricing rates are exploited in a shorter amount of time. From unreported statistics we do not 
observe something similar in our case. This evidence is not necessarily striking but it can reveal 
a market that reacts slowly to profitable arbitrage signals.    
To make the analysis more realistic we use the extended version of Gay and Jung 
(1999) model.  First, and only for the market makers, we introduce the cost of borrowing stocks 
( ). When market makers sell short stocks that were borrowed, 150% of the proceeds should 
be deposited in a margin account and as a result the short sales proceeds parameter is always 
zero (
brk
m = 0). The cost of borrowing stocks is set equal to  of the index value in 
order to reflect the opportunity cost of having 150% of the proceeds in a margin account earning 
no interest (see Ackert and Tian, 2001, for a similar approach). For large institutional traders we 
use  since they can always engage into (quasi) arbitrage trading with stocks that they 
already hold (a similar assumption is used by Bühler and Kempf, 1995).  
)(. 1e51 tTtr −
0=brk
 Second, for market makers and large institutional traders, we introduce  with values 
between 0 and 1% of the index level in order to approximate for other market impact costs that 
can result to tracking error. As suggested by Evnine and Rudd (1985) tracking error can exist 
even when index replication is performed with all stocks comprising the index (see also Bühler 
and Kempf, 1995, and Gay and Jung, 1999).  
trck
 Table 4 presents the results under the additional market frictions. The first column of 
figures (when =0) refers to the case where there is no tracking error but stock borrowing is trck
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costly (applies only for market makers); as a result, overpricing frequency and magnitude is as 
before. It can be seen that  is significant for market makers because there is an obvious 
decrease in the futures underpricing cases. This evidence coincides with the assessment of 
Modest and Sundaresan (1983) that futures underpricing can be also related to the loss of full 
use of short sales proceeds.  
brk
+ 2a
[Table 4, here] 
When tracking error is introduced, there is an additional decline in the number of 
futures mispricing cases for both categories of traders. For 1% tracking error, all overpricing 
opportunities disappear and there is a significant reduction in the underpriced cases. 
Nevertheless, for relatively reasonable levels of market impact cost of around 0.4%13, futures 
underpricing cases are large in number and still economically significant.  
 
5. Other Factors that Affect the Pricing of the FTASE Contracts 
In this section regression analysis is employed to identify other factors related with the 
mispricing rates. As in Gay and Jung (1999), (see also Brailsford and Cusack, 1997, Fung and 
Draper, 1999) the linear regression models include variables that are related with the futures 
time to maturity, market trend, and volatility. The analysis is done on a daily basis with the 
15:30-data based on the CoC model using the regression model given below: 
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In the above,  is the mispricing rate for day t and   is set equal to 0 if the time to maturity 
of the nearest (upcoming) futures contract is less than 14 (44) calendar days and to 1 otherwise 
(these values correspond to the average maturity of each contract class).  is the Moving 
Average Convergence Divergence technical indicator and it is defined as the difference between 
a 26-day and a 12-day exponential moving average indicator. Moreover,  ( ) is the 
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a
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maturity adjusted ARMA(2,1)-GARCH(1,1) anticipated (unanticipated) volatility of the 
FTSE/ASE-20 index. Regression results for the nearest and upcoming FTASE contract are 
presented in Table 5. All regression models are checked for serial correlation14 up to the fifth 
residual lag based on the Breusch-Godfrey LM statistic (Godfrey, 1988). The coefficient 
standard errors are estimated with White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
matrix. 
Daily market volatility is decomposed into anticipated and unanticipated using a two-
step approach (see Zhang et al., 2005). In the first step, an ARMA(2,1)-GARCH(1,1) 
specification (results are available upon request) is estimated using the FTASE/ASE-20 returns 
for the period 23/9/1997 to 31/12/2004 (call this Spec. #1). This is used to compute the daily 
market volatility via the fitted conditional standard deviation values of the model. In the second 
step, a volatility value is re-estimated daily using the above model specification based on prices 
beginning on 29/9/1997 and ending on the day prior to the day of each mispricing observation 
(call this Spec. #2). Using Spec. #2 we compute daily standard deviation return forecasts to 
estimate next day’s anticipated market volatility ( ). In addition the difference between Spec. 
#1 and Spec. #2 is used to estimate next day’s unanticipated market volatility (σ ). 
a
tσ
u
t
[Tables 5, here] 
From the results of Table 5, the coefficients on the lagged mispricing rates are positive 
and significant. This indicates persistence of the mispricing and complies with evidence by 
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988). For the nearest and upcoming contracts the time to 
maturity coefficient is positive15 most probably because the time to maturity effect is captured 
by the maturity adjusted volatility variables. Regarding the market trend variable, , it is 
marginally significant at 10% only for the nearest contract. This possibly indicates that futures 
mispricings are not affected by speculative trading that is related with the direction of the spot 
market. The anticipated volatility estimates are negative and statistically significant at 1% in 
both maturity contracts. In addition, the coefficient of the unanticipated volatility is negative 
and significant at 5% for the nearest to maturity contract and marginally insignificant at 10% for 
tMACD
 12 
the upcoming contract. The latter evidence is probably induced by the emerging characteristics 
of the underlying market that may not at all time reacting rationally and thus reflecting all 
available information. 
  
10. Conclusions 
The results allow us to study the efficiency evolution of this new market. If we accept that the 
cost-of-carry model is a true approximation of the correct futures price, then we must consider 
the Athens Derivatives Exchange to be inefficient, at least during its early trading history. Even 
under more general assumptions about the prevailing market frictions, one can still observe 
economically significant mispricing cases.  
The above analysis has different implications. First and most importantly, a significant 
dependence of the futures mispricings with volatility related variables has been identified by the 
regression analysis. This might imply that the futures market is dominated by the activities of 
hedgers (a similar conclusion is also reached by Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2007) who mainly 
wish to sell futures contracts in order to hedge their stock portfolio positions against volatility 
changes. Low cost traders like market makers and large institutional investors do not seem to 
actively engage in arbitrage trading in order to bring prices back to fundamental values. This 
might happen for various reasons like for example because of capital constrains (Tse, 2001, 
Basak and Croitoru, 2006), because specialized performance based arbitrage is ineffective in the 
presence of different agency relationships between arbitrageurs and investors (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), or because low cost traders in ADEX require extremely high risk premia in order 
to exploit the arbitrage opportunities (Bühler and Kempf, 1995). Moreover other market 
conditions that might have prevailed during this period − like the maturity, the size of the 
derivatives market and the limited number of derivatives products − did not help in attracting 
the attention of large (and foreign) arbitrage specialist.  
Second, our results complement and support other empirical evidence documented for 
the Athens Derivatives Exchange. For example, Alexakis et al. (2007) find that informed 
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investors are not indifferent between trading in the futures and the cash market since only 
information that is released by the cash market has as an effect on the futures behavior (the 
reverse does not hold); thus giving birth to exploitable arbitrage and hedging opportunities (see 
also Kenourgios,  2005). Moreover, Lafuente and Novales (2003) show that when there is a 
systematic mispricing between the futures and the spot market the hedging effectiveness is 
optimized when using a lower number of futures contracts compared to the position taken to the 
stock index portfolio. Then our findings can offer an additional explanation why in the study of 
Kavussanos and Visvikis (2007) the minimum variance hedge ratio is significantly below unity.    
 The results indicate that actions should be taken that will eventually help increase the 
futures market efficiency by allowing additional investors (local and foreign) to participate in 
the market. In addition, the Athens Stock Exchange sometimes behaves as an emerging market 
with periods of aggressive rises and falls; so policy makers should find ways to further enhance 
liquidity and stabilize the spot market. Finally, the stocks borrowing mechanism seems to be 
under used by market participants; for the period we consider, the number of contracts that 
investors could trade was small and the number of stocks available for index short selling was 
limited. Therefore, any arbitrage trade could have been done only with a small number of 
contracts resulting to limited profits.  
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Parameters related to the trading of the index and the futures contracts  
 
  Non-Exchange Members 
Institutional 
Investors 
Market 
Makers 
m FTASE 1 1 1 FT40M 1 1 1 
Lq ( ) % Sq
FTASE 12 (14) 12 (14) 12 (14) 
FT40M 12 (14) 12 (14) 12 (14) 
SLk  ( ) % SSk
FTASE 0.66 (0.96) 0.36 (0.66) 0.06 (0.36) 
FT40M 0.46 (0.76) 0.21 (0.51) 0.06 (0.36) 
FLk =  % FSk
FTASE 15 e.p.c. 5 e.p.c 0.22 e.p.c. 
FT40M 15 e.p.c. 5 e.p.c 0.22 e.p.c. 
 
FTASE (FT40M) are the tickers for the FTSE/ASE-20 (FTSE/ASE Mid-40) index futures contracts.  
( ) is the cost for taking a long (short) position in a comparable stock portfolio that replicates the index 
without any tracking error. ( ) is the cost for taking a long (short) position in the futures contract. 
( ) is the margin requirement for a long (short) futures position and m represents the availability rate 
of short sales proceeds The abbreviation “e.p.c.” stands for euros per contract. 
SLk
SSk
Lq q
FLk FSk
S
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Table 2: Mispricing rates for the FTASE contracts 
 
 One Month to Expiration  Two Months to Expiration 
 CoC Ind Ins MM  CoC Ind Ins MM 
 
Panel A: Futures mispricing statistics with data closest to 15:30 
Frequency of the mispricing (number of cases) 
Overpricing 254 0 1 88  190 0 0 72 
Fair Pricing 52 701 633 387  34 629 521 283 
Underpricing 415 20 87 246  497 92 200 366 
Descriptive statistics of the mispricing levels (in index points except * that are in %) 
Mean Overpricing 3.94 0.00 1.81 2.75  4.46 0.00 0.00 2.82 
Mean Overpricing* 0.32% 0.00% 0.12% 0.22%  0.36% 0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 
Mean Underpricing 7.53 8.01 6.59 7.27  13.11 11.39 12.10 12.52 
Mean Underpricing* 0.78% 0.97% 0.77% 0.79%  1.36% 1.37% 1.38% 1.35% 
 
Panel B: Futures mispricing statistics with data closest to 16:00 
Frequency of the mispricing (number of cases) 
Overpricing 237 0 2 83  180 0 3 69 
Fair Pricing 59 697 617 383  26 621 494 280 
Underpricing 425 24 102 255  515 100 224 372 
Descriptive statistics of the mispricing levels (in index points except * that are in %) 
Mean Overpricing 4.03 0.00 1.64 2.96  4.72 0.00 2.84 3.25 
Mean Overpricing* 0.33% 0.00% 0.12% 0.24%  0.39% 0.00% 0.23% 0.26% 
Mean Underpricing 7.97 7.60 6.65 7.78  13.33 11.17 11.57 13.02 
Mean Underpricing* 0.82% 0.92% 0.77% 0.84%  1.38% 1.34% 1.32% 1.40% 
 
Panel C: Futures mispricing statistics with closing index and futures data 
Frequency of the mispricing (number of cases) 
Overpricing 198 0 1 84  162 0 3 69 
Fair Pricing 106 694 605 355  49 622 495 259 
Underpricing 417 27 115 282  510 99 223 393 
Descriptive statistics of the mispricing levels (in index points except * that are in %) 
Mean Overpricing 4.29 0.00 1.60 3.37  4.52 0.00 1.46 3.28 
Mean Overpricing* 0.35% 0.00% 0.14% 0.27%  0.37% 0.00% 0.13% 0.27% 
Mean Underpricing 8.28 8.21 6.78 7.83  13.51 12.24 12.18 12.94 
Mean Underpricing* 0.85% 0.99% 0.78% 0.84%  1.39% 1.47% 1.39% 1.38% 
          
 
The mispricing statistics concern 721 trading days for the two nearest to maturity future contracts of the 
FTSE/ASE-20 index. CoC represents the cost-of-carry model (under no transaction costs). In addition, Ind, Ins 
and MM refer to the mispricing rates for individuals (non-exchange members), large institutional investors and 
market makers (under transaction costs shown in Table 1). The upper part of each panel presents the frequency 
of mispricing rates and the lower tabulates the mean values of the mispricing rates.         
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Table 3: Ex-ante arbitrage tests regarding the FTASE contracts for market makers (and large 
institutional traders) 
       
                                       1m                    2m                 3m                 4m                5m                  C 
 
Panel A: Ex-ante arbitrage statistics for the nearest futures contract 
 Frequency of the mispricing (number of cases) 
Overpricing 83 (1) 81 (1) 78 (1) 75 (1) 72 (1) 71 (1) 
Fair Pricing 394 (634) 400 (637) 409 (636) 413 (638) 419 (638) 430 (647) 
Underpricing 244 (86) 240 (83) 234 (84) 233 (82) 230 (82)  220 (73) 
 Descriptive  statistics of the mispricing levels in index points 
Mean Overpric. 2.61 (2.03) 2.60 (2.14) 2.57 (2.29) 2.59 (2.28) 2.53 (2.60) 3.31(6.22) 
Mean Underpric. 7.28 (6.56) 7.25 (6.59) 7.25 (6.64) 7.25 (6.61) 7.24 (6.59) 7.42 (6.58) 
       
Panel B: Ex-ante arbitrage statistics for the upcoming futures contract
 Frequency of the mispricing (number of cases) 
Overpricing 68 (0) 66 (0) 64 (0) 63 (0) 63 (0) 58 (0) 
Fair Pricing 291 (522) 295 (522) 300 (522) 301 (523) 298 (523) 322 (528) 
Underpricing 362 (199) 360 (199) 357 (199) 357 (198) 360 (198) 341 (193) 
 Descriptive statistics of the mispricing levels in index points 
Mean Overpric. 2.66 (0.00) 2.64 (0.00) 2.70 (0.00) 2.71 (0.00) 2.65 (0.00) 3.37 (0.00) 
Mean Underpric. 12.5 (12.1) 12.5 (12.1) 12.5 (12.1) 12.5 (12.2) 12.6 (12.2) 12.7 (12.2) 
 
 
Ex-ante arbitrage profits under market frictions and transaction costs incurred by market makers and large 
institutional investors (low cost traders). The tabulated statistics concern 721 trading days for the two nearest to 
maturity future contracts of the FTSE/ASE-20 index. In each case, results for large institutional investors are 
reported in parenthesis.  The results are computed by assuming an instantaneous futures trading and time delay 
for the index position. The time delays for the index trading are for one (1m) to five (5m) minutes and for same 
day’s closing prices (C). The upper part of each panel presents the frequency of mispricing rates and the lower 
tabulates the mean mispricing values in index points.      
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Table 4: Mispricing statistics for market makers (and large institutional traders) for the FTASE contracts 
under costs for borrowing stocks and tracking error  
  
 Tracking Error ( ) trck
 0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 
 
Panel A: Futures mispricing statistics for the nearest futures contract 
Frequency of the mispricing (number of cases) 
Overpricing 88 (1) 40 (0) 15 (0) 6 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 
Fair Pricing 445 (633) 540 (654) 610 (673) 640 (682) 665 (693) 678 (701) 
Underpricing 188 (87) 141 (67) 96 (48) 75 (39) 55 (28) 43 (20) 
Descriptive statistics of the mispricing levels (in index points except * that are in %) 
Mean Overpricing 2.75 (1.81) 2.26 (0.00) 1.91 (0.00) 1.33 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Mean Overpricing (%)* 0.22 (0.12) 0.18 (0.00) 0.15 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Mean Underpricing 6.14 (6.59) 6.05 (6.56) 6.68 (7.17) 6.49 (6.90) 6.75 (7.62) 6.70 (8.67) 
Mean Underpricing (%)* 0.69 (0.77) 0.70 (0.78) 0.78 (0.86) 0.77 (0.83) 0.81 (0.92) 0.81 (1.05) 
 
Panel B: Futures mispricing statistics for the upcoming futures contract
Frequency of the mispricing (number of cases) 
Overpricing 72 (0) 34 (0) 11 (0) 7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Fair Pricing 446 (521) 499 (538) 545 (565) 576 (597) 600 (618) 625 (625) 
Underpricing 203 (200) 188 (183) 165 (156) 138 (124) 121 (103) 96 (96) 
Descriptive statistics of the mispricing levels (in index points except * that are in %) 
Mean Overpricing 2.82 (0.00) 2.28 (0.00) 2.51 (0.00) 0.87 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Mean Overpricing (%)* 0.23 (0.00) 0.19 (0.00) 0.21 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Mean Underpricing 12.48 (12.1) 11.48 (11.2) 11.05 (11.1) 11.16 (12.0) 10.84 (12.4) 11.62 (11.5) 
Mean Underpricing (%)* 1.42 (1.38) 1.32 (1.30) 1.29 (1.31) 1.32 (1.43) 1.30 (1.49) 1.41 (1.39) 
       
 
The mispricing statistics concern 721 trading days for the two nearest to maturity future contracts of the 
FTSE/ASE-20 index. In each case, results for large institutional investors are reported in parenthesis.  The results 
refer to theoretical futures bounds under additional transaction costs that account for the cost of borrowing stocks 
( ) and tracking error ( ). When = 0% only the cost of borrowing stocks is considered. The upper part 
of each panel presents the frequency of mispricing rates and the lower tabulates the mean values of the mispricing 
rates.         
brk trck trck
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Table 5: Regression analysis for the FTASE mispricing rates  
            
 0α * 11α  12α  13α  2α * 3α * 41α  42α  5α  
2
adjR  )(5x 2  
            
 0.18 0.80 --- --- 0.84 0.01 -2.47 1.75 -2.08 0.697 6.857 1M [0.65] [0.00] [0.09] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]   
            
2M 0.43 0.79 0.06 0.10 0.27 0.01 -1.54 1.23 -0.83 0.877 5.52 [0.65] [0.00] [0.36] [0.05] [0.50] [0.35] [0.00] [0.02] [0.12]   
 
 
Regression results for the near (1M) and upcoming (2M) maturity futures contracts. Mispricing rates are 
based on the cost of carry model for the period 2002-2004 for 721 observations. The regression model is 
based on the following definition:  
∑∑
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where  is the futures mispricing rate, is a dummy variable related with the futures time to maturity, 
 is the Moving Average Convergence Divergence technical indicator and  ( ) is the maturity 
adjusted ARMA(2,1)-GARCH(1,1) anticipated (unanticipated) volatility of the FTSE/ASE-20 index. All 
regression results are based on the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance 
matrix. The Chi-Square test refers to the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM statistic for serial correlation 
up to the fifth lag (the critical value at 5% significance level for five lags is 11.10). To avoid autocorrelation 
in the residuals, one (three) lagged values of the futures mispricing rates is (are) included for the nearest 
(upcoming) futures contracts. For the same reason we include one lag value of the anticipated volatility. 
Figures with (*) are multiplied by 1,000. 
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Endnotes  
                                          
1 To our knowledge, Kenourgios (2005) uses minute-by-minute prices to examine the joint hypothesis of 
market efficiency and unbiasedness (only) for the FTSE/ASE-20 index futures contracts using 
cointegration analysis for the period March 2000 to March 2002. 
2 We examined the existence of cycles with a regression analysis in which we have used three yearly 
dummies to represent the trading years under investigation and we observed a clear U shape in the 
estimated dummy coefficients and their corresponding p-values (results not reported for brevity). 
3 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Basak and Croitoru (2006) show that under capital constrains 
arbitrageurs (e.g. low cost traders) limit the size of their trades and never fully “arbitrage away” the 
mispricing rates.  
4 Basak and Croitoru (2006) develop a model where arbitrage opportunities arise endogenously in 
equilibrium in the presence heterogeneous rational investors that are subject to investment restrictions.  
5 These Euro values are transformed to represent percentage values of the index level by dividing them 
with the level of the index times the index multiplier.   
6 The transaction costs used here seem on average to be higher compared to the ones used as benchmark 
in Dwyer et al. (1996) which is 0.25% of the index value for exchange members and 0.38% for 
institutional investors. Also in Bühler and Kempf (1995) for low cost traders the total transaction cost of a 
long arbitrage position is about 0.125% of the value of the stock portfolio and on average around 0.50% 
for a short arbitrage (including the cost of borrowing the stocks).     
7 For the period 2002-2004, the average index value for FTSE/ASE-20 is about 1,128 whereas for 
FTSE/ASE Mid-40 is about 2,201. 
8 The differential margin for the short and long futures positions is not significant and does not change 
our results. 
9 kSL and kSS refer to transaction costs paid under the assumption that tracking error does not exist when 
taking a long (short) position to a comparable stock portfolio that replicates the underlying index. We 
have introduced ktrc as an additional transaction cost proportional to the index level to mitigate this market 
friction.    
10 Tick futures and index transactions data were obtained from the AGFN database (ADEX official data 
vendor). Closing prices, volumes and open interest for the FTASE futures contract were obtained from 
the ADEX research department and closing index prices from the ASE research department. 
11 Our results are robust to the levels of dividend yields and risk-free rates used. 
12 It is rare for the market value of the futures to be exactly the same with the CoC estimate. A transaction 
is considered to be mispriced if it deviates by more than -/+0.05% for intraday data or by more than 0.1% 
for closing data.  
13 This value is even higher compared to the levels of other studies. Gay and Jung (1999) assume that the 
market impact cost from trading a 50-stock portfolio that replicates an index comprised by 200 stocks is 
about 0.4% of the index value. Bühler and Kempf (1994) document that DAX futures index arbitrager are 
willing to trade only if, in addition to transaction costs, a required risk premium equal to 4 index points is 
covered by the mispricing.  
14 To avoid autocorrelation in the residuals, lagged values of the futures mispricing rates and of the 
anticipated volatility are included. 
15 Using a regression model where volatility related variables are excluded we find that the coefficient of 
time to maturity is negative for both maturities and statistically significant for the nearest contract. This 
evidence complies with previous research (i.e. MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988 and Bühler and Kempf, 
1995). 
